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NOTES 
Extraterritorial Application of the Export Administration Act 
of 1979 Under International and American Law 
The United States embargo is a serious mater . . . . By claiming the 
right to extend American law to other territories it is affecting not only the 
interests of the European trading nations but also their sovereignty. 
-West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt* 
Section six of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (EAA) 1 au-
thorizes the President to "prohibit or curtail the exportation of any 
goods,2 technology,3 or other information subject to the jurisdiction 
of the United States or exported by any person4 subject to the juris-
diction of the United States,5 to the extent necessary to further signif-
icantly the foreign policy of the United States. . . ."6 Pursuant to 
this authorization, on June 18, 1982, President Reagan announced 
that, as an intensified response to the continued repression in Po-
land, he was extending and expanding export controls on oil and gas 
* N.Y. Times, July 24, 1982, at S, col. 2 (commenting on the extraterritorial application of 
oil and gas equipment regulations promulgated under the Export Administration Act), 
l. SO U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (Supp. III 1979). 
2. The term "good" as used in EAA means "any article, material, supply or manufactured 
product, including inspection and test equipment, and excluding technical data." SO U.S.C. 
app. § 2415(3) (Supp. III 1979). 
3. The term "technology" as used in the EAA means ''the information and knowhow that 
can be used to design, produce, manufacture, utilize, or reconstruct goods, including computer 
software and technical data but not the goods themselves." SO U.S.C. app. § 2415(4) (Supp. III 
1979). 
4. The term "person" as used in the EAA includes "any individual, partnership, corpora-
tion, or other form of association, including any government or agency thereof." SO U.S.C. 
app. § 2415(1) (Supp. III 1979). 
S. The term "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" is not defined anywhere in 
the EAA. The term "person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States," for the purposes 
of the Amendment of the Oil and Gas Controls to the USSR, was defined as: 
(i) Any person wherever located, who is a citizen or resident of the United States; 
(ii) Any person actually within the United States; 
(iii) Any corporation organized under the laws of the United States or of any state, terri-
tory, possession or district of the United States; or 
(iv) Any partnership, association, corporation, or other organization, wherever organ• 
ized or doing business, that is owned or controlled by persons specified in (i), (ii), or (iii) 
of this section. 
IS C.F.R. § 385.2(c) (1982). 
The United States has not consistently defined the scope of "person subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the United States" in the same manner as it did in the Amendments of the Oil and Gas 
Controls. See generally note 93 infra and accompanying text. 
6. SO U.S.C. app. § 240S(a)(l) (Supp. III 1979) (footnotes added). The EAA also autho-
rizes the President to prohibit or curtail exports for national security reasons where there is a 
shortage of the product in the United States. See SO U.S.C. app. §§ 2404, 2406 (Supp. III 
1979). The short supply controls are not pertinent to the discussion in this Note. 
1308 
April 1983) Export Controls 1309 
equipment destined for the Soviet Union.7 The expanded controls 
sought to regulate not only exports from American corporations8 but 
also goods produced by the overseas subsidiaries of American corpo-
rations.9 Furthermore, the export controls purported to control the 
exports of foreign corporations10 that had received specified Ameri-
can goods 11 or were producing these goods under licensing agree-
ments with the American companies.12 This action marked the first 
extraterritorial application of the EAA to foreign subsidiaries and 
licensees.13 
The European Economic Community (EEC) sharply criticized 
these controls.14 In addition, several countries ordered the corpora-
tions located in their countries not to comply with President Rea-
gan's directive15 even when the companies confronted serious threats 
1. See Statement on Extension ofU.S. Sanctions, 18 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 820 (June 
21, 1982). The June 18, 1982 regulations expanded the Controls on Exports of Petroleum 
Transmission and Refining Equipment, 15 C.F.R. §§ 376,379,385,399 (1982), which had been 
issued on December 30, 1981. The December regulations imposed foreign policy controls on 
exports to the U.S.S.R. of commodities for the transmission and refinement of petroleum or 
natural gas and technical data related to oil and gas transmission or refinement emanating 
from the United States. See Johnston, Foreign Policy Export Controls, 82 U.S. DEPT. ST. 
BULL., June 1982, at 55, reprinted in 21 INTL. LEGAL MATERIALS 853 (1982); Amendment of 
Oil and Gas Controls to the U.S.S.R., 47 Fed. Reg. 25,250 (1982) (codified at 15 C.F.R. 
§§ 376, 379, 385 (1982)), reprinted in 21 INTL. LEGAL MATERIALS 854 (1982). 
8. The term "American corporation or company" as used in this Note is defined to mean 
an artificial person or legal entity created under the authority of the laws of the United States 
or a state, territory, district or possession of the United States. 
9. The term "foreign subsidiaries of American corporations" as used in this Note is defined 
to mean a corporation organized under the laws of a state other than the United States in 
which an American corporation has control in fact. 
10. The term "foreign corporation" as used in this Note is defined to mean a corporation 
created by or under the laws of a country other than the United States. 
11. See 15 C.F.R. § 399.l (supp. No. 1, 1982), reprinted in INTL. LEGAL MATERIALS 864-
65. (The products whose reexports was prohibited included: equipment and parts used in the 
transmission, transportation and refining of petroleum and natural gas, compressors, industrial 
gas turbines and chemicals intended for use in the refining process). 
12. See 15 C.F.R. § 379.4 (1982), reprinted in 21 INTL. LEGAL MATERIALS 864-65 (1982). 
13. N.Y. Times, June 19, 1982, at 1, col. 2; Abbott, Linking Trade to Political Goals: For-
eign Policy Export Controls in the 1970's and 1980's, 65 MINN. L. REV. 739, 847 (1981) [herein-
after cited as Abbott]. 
14. See, e.g., European Communities: Comments on the U.S. Regulations Concerning 
Trade With the U.S.S.R., 21 INTL. LEGAL MATERIALS 891 (1982) [hereinafter EEC Comments 
on U.S. Regulations]. ("[T]he U.S. regulations as amended contain sweeping extensions of 
U.S. jurisdiction which are unlawful under international law.") For the French reaction, see 
N.Y. Times, July 23, 1982, at Al, col. 6. (French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson warned 
of a "progressive divorce" between the United States and European nations). For a non-Euro-
pean perspective on the export restrictions, see, e.g., N.Y. Times, June 22, 1982, at Dl6, col. l 
(Japanese business and government leaders voiced irritation with the American action and 
lodged a "strong protest" with the American Government). 
15. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1982, at Al, col. 2 (The British invoked Section 1(1) of 
the Protection of Trading Interests Act, ordering four companies to comply with their contracts 
with the Soviet Union. In issuing the order, Lord Cockfield, Great Britian's Foreign Trade 
Secretary, stated: "The embargo in the terms which it has been imposed is an attempt to 
interfere with existing contracts and is an unacceptable extension of American extraterritorial 
jurisdiction in a way that is repugnant to international law."). For the full text of the British 
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from the American government.16 The European defiance of the 
American restrictions resulted in severe sanctions to the exporting 
companies.17 These sanctions were later partially abated due to 
strong domestic and international pressure18 and ultimately were ter-
minated on November 13, 1982, when President Reagan lifted the 
embargo.19 
This Note investigates the legality of the extraterritorial applica-
tion of the EAA20 under American and international law, with a par-
ticular focus on the presidential action in the Soviet Oil and Gas 
Equipment Export Controls case (hereinafter the Soviet Pipeline 
case). Part I examines the language and legislative history of the 
EAA and concludes that Congress clearly and affirmatively ex-
pressed its intention to apply export controls to foreign subsidiaries 
of American corporations as well as goods and technology21 that 
Protection of Trading Interests Act, see 21 INTL. LEGAL MATERIALS 834 (1982). For the text of 
the British Statement and Order invoking the Protection of Trading Interests Act, see Id. , at 
851. For an account of the French action, see N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1982, at DI, col. 4. (The 
French government "requisitioned" the services of Dresser France, a subsidiary of the Ameri-
can corporation Dresser Industries, and ordered the company to comply with its $700 million 
contract for pipeline equipment with the Soviet Union). 
16. See, e.g., Wall St. J., Aug. 25, 1982, at 3, col. 2; N.Y. Times, June 24, 1982, at Al, col. 5 
(The U.S. threatened complete blacklisting of companies that did not comply with the 
embargo). 
17. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1982, at Al, col. 4 (on August 26, 1982 the Reagan 
Administration placed Creusot Loire and Dresser France on the "temporary denial list" which 
prevented those companies from doing any business with the United States). 
18. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1982, at Al, col. 4 (President Reagan eased the sanctions 
on the French companies to encompass only a denial of American oil and gas equipment. 
Treasury Secretary Donald Regan called the original sanctions "a little too sweeping.") It was 
reported that the real reason behind the abatement of sanctions was to appease the British 
government At the time that the French sanctions were abated the United States was about to 
impose sanctions on British companies as well. Id. at col. 1. The British companies were 
sanctioned on September 9, 1982 but the sanctions only included denial of oil and gas equip-
ment from the United States. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1982, Bl, col. 1. The British reaction 
to the abated restrictions was still strong. On the day following the sanctions the British gov-
ernment accused the United States of "damaging trans-Atlantic relations" and ordered two 
other British companies to disregard the American restrictions or face large penalties under the 
British Protection of Trading Interests Act. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1982, at 19, col. 2. 
19. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1982, at 1, col. 6 (President Reagan lifted the sanctions be-
cause the United States had reached a "substantial agreement" with its allies on a comprehen-
sive plan to restrict trade to the Soviet Union. The specifics of the agreement included stricter 
controls on high technology equipment and tighter controls on preferential credit terms given 
to the Soviet Union.). 
20. This Note will focus on the legal problems presented by the extraterritorial application 
of the EAA's foreign policy and national security export controls. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2404, 
2405 (Supp. III 1979). The Note will not discuss the issues presented by the extraterritorial 
application of the EAA's antiboycott provision as applied to foreign subsidiaries of American 
corporations. For a discussion of the latter issue see Note, Extraterritorial Application of the 
Export Administration Amendments of 1977, 8 GA. J. INTL. & COMP. L 741 (1978). 
21. In the Soviet Pipeline case, controls on goods and technologies involved two types of 
foreign corporations: (1) companies such as Alsthome Atlantique, a French corporation that 
used American technology to produce goods in its home country, and (2) corporations such as 
John Brown Engineering, a British corporation, who were to make products with component 
parts received from American companies. See generally EcoNOMIST, Aug. 14, 1982, at 59. 
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originate in the United States. Part II analyzes the extraterritorial 
application of the EAA under the generally recognized principles of 
international law. The Note argues that the United States' bases for 
extraterritorial jurisdiction are generally unsupportable. Addition-
ally, even if the United States did have a valid ground for jurisdic-
tion, considerations such as comity and respect for the sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of foreign nations should persuade the 
United States to acquiesce to assertions of territorial jurisdiction by 
affected states in the event of a conflict. 
l. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT To APPLY THE EAA 
EXTRATERRITORIALL Y 
Although the EAA22 permits the President to control exports 
These types of foreign corporations are discussed separately in this Note because they raise 
different issues under the EAA. 
22. The EAA of 1979 is the most recent in a long line of export control statutes that began 
with the Act of July 2, 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-703, § 6, 54 Stat. 712 (1940). The intent of this act 
was to prohibit or curtail the exportation of military equipment and munitions. See Berman, 
The Export Administration Act: International Aspects, 14 AM. SocY. INTL. L. PROCEED. 82 
(1981). Following World War II, the principal purpose of the various export control acts was 
to exercise "the necessary vigilance over exports from the standpoint of their significance for 
national security" and to prevent exports of goods that were in short supply in the United 
States. See Berman and Garson, United States Export Controls - Past, Present, and Future. 
67 CoLUM. L. Rev. 791, 796 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Berman & Garson]. The 1979 EAA 
was the first export control act to treat national security controls and foreign policy controls 
separately. By distinguishing the two types of controls, Congress attempted to limit presiden-
tial authority to control exports for foreign policy purposes. See Abbott, supra note 13, at 857-
58. The Congress attempted to circumscribe executive power by requiring the President to 
apply specified criteria when imposing, expanding or extending export controls for foreign 
policy reasons. These criteria include: 
(I) the probability that such controls will achieve the intended foreign policy purpose, in 
light of other factors, including the availability from other countries of the goods or 
technology proposed for such controls; 
(2) the compatibility of the proposed controls with the foreign policy objectives of the 
United States, including the effort to counter international terrorism, and with over-
all United States policy toward the country which is the proposed target of the 
controls; 
(3) the reaction of other countries to the imposition or expansion of such export controls 
by the United States; 
(4) the likely effects of the proposed controls on the export performance of the United 
States, on the competitive position of the United States in the international economy, 
on the international reputation of the United States as a supplier of goods and tech-
nology, and on individual United States companies and their employees and com-
munities, including the effects of the controls on the existing contracts; 
(5) the ability of the United States to enforce the proposed controls effectively; and 
(6) the foreign policy consequences of not imposing controls. 
50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(b) (Supp. Ill 1979). Both the December and June regulations on exports 
of petroleum equipment stated that the President had considered the criteria set forth in the 
EAA. See Controls On Exports of Petroleum Transmission and Refining Equipment to the 
U.S.S.R., 47 Fed. Reg. 141-44 (1982) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. §§ 379.4(f)(l)(i)(p), 385.2(c), 
Supp. I to 399.1, (Supp. I to 399.2)), reprinted in 21 INTL. LEGAL MATERIALS 855-58 (1982); 
Amendment of Oil and Gas Controls to the U.S.S.R., 47 Fed. Reg. 27,250-52 (1982) (to be 
codified in 15 C.F.R. §§ 376.12, 379.8(a)(2}-(4}, 385.2(a) & (c}), reprinted in 21 INTL. LEGAL 
MATERIALS 864-66 (1982). The EEC maintained that the President had violated the criteria 
set forth in the EAA. See EEC Comments on U.S. Regulations, supra note 14, at 901-02. ("It 
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physically leaving from the United States,23 the President is not con-
stitutionally authorized to control exports outside the territorial 
boundaries of the United States absent a clear and affirmative con-
gressional delegation of such power.24 Furthermore, while congres-
sional action can extend beyond the United States' boundaries,25 an 
established rule of statutory construction dictates that a congres-
sional act presumptively does not apply extraterritorially.26 Hence, 
the extraterritorial application of the EAA raises a question of statu-
tory construction rather than congressional power. 
Although some observers found the language and legislative his-
tory of the EAA unclear,27 an amendment to the 1969 version of the 
can hardly be claimed that the U.S. measures satisfy the criteria laid down in the Export 
Administration Act."). 
23. Although the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations is expressly vested in 
Congress, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, this power may be delegated to the President by an 
express or implied authorization of Congress. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 
U.S. 579 (1952). The authority delegated to the President by section 6 of the EAA, 50 U.S.C. 
app. § 2405 (Supp. III 1979), was used by the President to impose the Soviet oil and gas equip-
ment export controls. For an analysis of the constitutional separation of powers problems 
arising from the broad delegation of congressional power in the EAA, see Note,Accountabll/1)' 
and the Foreign Commerce Power: A Case Study of the Regulation of Exports, 9 GA. J. INTL. & 
COMP. L. 577 (1979). 
24. See, e.g., Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138, 146-47 (1957); Foley Bros. 
v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949); United States v. Mitchell, 553 F.2d 996, 1002 (5th Cir. 
1977). 
25. It is a well established principle of American law that Congress can attach extraterrito-
rial effect to its enactments. There are no constitutional limitations to this power. See, e.g., 
Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 282 (1952) ("Congress in prescribing standards of 
conduct for American citizens may project the impact of its laws beyond the territorial bound• 
aries of the United States.") (citations omitted); Vermila-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377, 
381, 497-508 (1948); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421,437 (1932) (the United States can 
require, under pain of criminal contempt, the return of a citizen residing in a foreign country). 
In the past, courts have applied American laws extraterritorially in many areas. See, e.g., UT 
v. Vencap Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975) (finding subject matter jurisdiction under federal 
securities laws in suit for damages or rescission by defrauded foreigner where United States 
served as base for manufacturing fraudulent security devices for export); Stegeman v. United 
States, 425 F.2d 984 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 837 (1970) (applying Bankrupty Act 
where American debtors outside the United States had concealed property belonging to the 
bankruptcy estate, since to do otherwise "would frustrate the statute's purpose by creating an 
obvious and readily available means of evasion."); Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific Far East 
Line, 404 F.2d 804 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969) (applying antitrust laws 
to the carriage of foreign-owned goods between foreign ports in American vessels). But see 
Reyes v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 476 F.2d 910,915 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1973) 
(social security laws do not apply extraterritorially). 
26. See, e.g., Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949). Accord, RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 38 (1965) (hereinafter RESTATEMENT] ("Rules of 
United States statutory law, whether prescribed by federal or state authority, apply only to 
conduct occurring within, or having effect within, the territory of the United States, unless the 
contrary is clearly indicateft by the statute."). 
27. See Economic Relations With the Soviet Union: Hearings Before the Senate Subcomm. 
on International Economic Policy and the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 97th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 195 (1982) ("The legislative history of this amendment reveals more than a little confu-
sion over what powers Members of Congress thought they were granting the President.") 
(statement of Alexander Trowbridge, President, National Association of Manufacturers). 
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EAA clearly demonstrates the congressional intent to control the ex-
ports of foreign subsidiaries of American corporations. While the 
1969 statute could not be applied extraterritorially,28 in 1977 Con-
gress amended the Act to allow the President to control exports 
"subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or exported by any 
person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States."29 The con-
gressional reports discussing this amendment state that the purpose 
of the change was "to confer non-emergency authority under [the 
EAA] to control non-U.S.-origin exports by foreign subsidiaries of 
U.S. concems."30 The language of the 1977 amendment remained 
intact when the Act was renewed in 1979.31 
The legislative history of the 1979 EAA adds further evidence of 
congressional intention to continue presidential power to control ex-
ports by American subsidiaries. The Senate report on the 1979 EAA 
considered an amendment to the EAA which would have prohibited 
controls on non-U.S.-exports of foreign subsidiaries.32 Although the 
report noted the diplomatic friction generated by claims of U.S. ju-
risdiction over foreign subsidiaries, the Senate nevertheless rejected 
the amendment.33 Thus, by adding the language "person subject to 
the jurisdiction of the United States" to the EAA in 1977, Congress 
clearly expressed its intention to include American subsidiaries 
based in foreign nations. 
Congress also intended the 1979 EAA to apply extraterritorially 
to goods and technology that originate in the United States. The 
scope of the relevant statutory language - "goods [and] technology 
. . . subject to the jurisdiction of the United States"34 - is ambigu-
ous, necessitating an inquiry into its legislative history. The 1977 
amendment of the 1969 EAA is again enlightening.35 After discuss-
ing the intent to provide authority to control exports of foreign sub-
sidiaries of American corporations, the House report states that the 
power to control subsidiaries "is in addition to the authority cur-
28. Abbott, supra note 13, at 846. 
29. Section 4(a)(b)(l) of the 1969 EAA was amended to read: 
To effectuate the policies set forth in section 3 of this Act, the President may prohibit or 
curtail the exportation [from the United States, its territories and possessions, of any arti-
cles, materials, or supplies including technical data or any other information], except under 
such rules and regulations as he shall prescribe, of any articles, materials or supplies, includ-
ing technical data or any other information, subject to the jurisdiction of the United Stales or 
exported by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United Stales. 
H.R. Rep. No. 459, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1977) (bracketed material was deleted from the 
1969 EAA; italicized material was added). 
30. S. REP. No. 466, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1977). 
31. See text at note 6 supra. 
32. S. REP. No. 169, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1979). 
33. Id 
34. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405{a)(l) (Supp. III 1979). 
35. See note 29 supra. 
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rently provided in the EAA for control over the exports of U.S. ori-
gin goods and technology whether from the U.S. or abroad "36 Read 
in light of the long history of extraterritorial reexport37 controls38 
under the various export control acts, this language indicates that 
Congress intended to continue the extraterritorial application of the 
EAA with respect to goods and technology originating in the United 
States. That the Congress rejected an amendment that would have 
eliminated reexport controls when it adopted the 1979 EAA39 further 
demonstrates the congressional intention to control goods and tech-
nology extraterritorially. 
In short, the legislative history of the EAA convincingly evi-
dences congressional intent to authorize extraterritorial application 
of the EAA to subsidiaries as well as goods and technologies. Be-
cause such an authorization does not exceed congressional authority, 
under American law the President can apply the EAA to activities 
outside the United States. 
36. H. REP. No. 459, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1977) (emphasis added). 
37. "The term reexport [as used] in the Export Administration Regulations includes reex-
port, transshipment, or diversion of commodities or technical data from one foreign destina-
tion to another." 15 C.F.R. § 370.2 (1982). 
38. The United States has a long history of controlling reexports of goods and technology 
in the possession of both American and foreign entities. Several common fact pallems emerge 
from the reported cases. For example, in Jarach Guella Indus. Overseas Co., 22 Fed. Reg. 
4510 (1957), and Sudexport and General Import Export Co., 22 Fed. Reg. 4512 (1957), the 
exporters obtained export licenses by falsely representing the ultimate destination of the goods, 
When the goods were transshipped to restricted countries after they reached their stated desti-
nation, the government revoked the export licenses and imposed a denial of future export 
privileges. See also William Kurt Samuel Wallersteiner, 22 Fed. Reg. 1650 (1957). 
The case of Raytheon Manufacturing Co., 24 Fed. Reg. 2626 (1959), presents a common 
illustration of how reexport controls are imposed on foreign companies. In that case, Ray-
theon, an American corporation, exported restricted microwave communication equipment to 
Pye Telecommunications, an English corporation. Pye incorporated the equipment into a 
larger product and shipped it to an unauthorized destination. The government imposed sanc-
tions on both Raytheon and Pye. 
The EAA has also been applied to control the reexport of technological data licensed by an 
American corporation to a foreign corporation. See SNAM Progelli S.P.A., 35 Fed. Reg. 2460 
(1970). 
In all three of the scenarios noted above the exports were restricted before they left the 
United States. However, this fact alone is not dispositive. See American Presi~nt Lines v. 
China Mul Trading Co., 1953 A.M.C. 1510 (Supreme Court of Hong Kong) (United States 
auempted to restrict goods that were not subject to export controls when they departed from 
the United States). 
39. In 1979, the House rejected an amendment that would have eliminated reexport con-
trols on U.S. goods in certain specified countries. The House decided that reexport controls 
were a necessary evil without which there would be an "enormous loophole through which 
third country transfers could legally be made." 125 CONG. REC, 24039 (1979) (remarks by Rep. 
Wolfi). The decision to keep reexport controls, given the long history of extraterritorial appli-
cation, see note 38 supra, demonstrates the congressional intent to apply the EAA extraterrito-
rially to goods and technology. 
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II. EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY 
AND FOREIGN POLICY EXPORT CONTROLS UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
One of the principal objections made by the European Economic 
Community (EEC) to the extraterritorial application of section six of 
the EAA in the Soviet pipeline case was that the assertion of extra-
territorial jurisdiction violated fundamental principles of interna-
tional law.40 After analyzing the relevance of international law for 
the future extraterritorial application of United States export con-
trols, this Part critically assesses the EEC's claim. This analysis con-
cludes that the extraterritorial application of the EAA in the Soviet 
pipeline case indeed exceeds the limits on a state's jurisdiction gener-
ally recognized under international law. Moreover, when foreign 
states assert territorial jurisdiction in conflict with the application of 
the Act, international law favors the claim of the territorial state. 
A. The Relevance of International Law 
Skeptics dubious about the influence of international law on the 
behavior of sovereign states41 might describe the Soviet pipeline case 
as a classic example of power politics overriding legal norms. A con-
flict between the superpowers is among the least promising contexts 
for the influence of international law on perceptions of national in-
terest.42 Analysis of the legal issues should therefore begin by re-
sponding to the legitimate question whether "it is fruitless to dissect 
the legal technicalities of the pipeline controls because it is really a 
policy issue."43 
The role of international law in the municipal law of the United 
States tends to reinforce this view. It is well established that interna-
tional law is part of American law and must be ascertained and ap-
40. See EEC Commentary on U.S. Regulations,supra note 14, at 897 ("[l]t is clear that the 
U.S. measures .•. do not find a valid basis in any of the generally recognized - or even 
more controversial - principles of international law governing state jurisdiction to prescribe 
rules. . . . [f]he measures by their extra-territorial character simultaneously infringe the terri-
toriality and nationality principles of jurisdiction and are therefore unlawful under interna-
tional law."). 
41. See, e.g., H. MORGANTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS 282 (4th ed. 1967) ("[W]hether 
or not an attempt will be made to enforce international law and whether or not the attempt 
will be successful do not depend primarily upon legal considerations and the disinterested 
operation oflaw-enforcing mechanisms. Both attempt and success depend upon political con-
siderations and the actual distribution of power in a particular case."). 
42. See, e.g., Acheson, Remarks, 51 AM. SocY. INTL. L. PROC. 14 (1963) (concerning the 
Cuban missle crisis: "I must conclude that the propriety of the Cuban quarantine is not a legal 
issue. The power, position and prestige of the United States had been challenged by another 
state; and law simply does not deal with such questions of ultimate power. . • ."). 
43. Hearings, supra note 27, at 190 (testimony of Alexander Trowbridge, President, Na-
tional Association of Manufacturers). 
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plied by American courts.44 International law, however, "bends to 
the will of Congress"45 and must give way when it conflicts with a 
federal statute46 such as the EAA. Given this hierarchy, even if a 
federal statute directly conflicts with a principle of international law, 
American courts will enforce the national legislation.47 
To minimize such conflicts, American jurisprudence recognizes a 
rule of statutory construction requiring that "an act of Congress 
ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other 
possible construction remains."48 Part I of this Note, however, has 
demonstrated the clear congressional intent to apply the EAA extra-
territorially. Moreover, the Act's legislative history indicates that 
Congress was aware of the likely response of the international com-
munity to such action. Congress received a great deal of testimony 
noting that, because other countries perceive an offense to their sov-
ereignty,49 extraterritorial trade controls had been a source of irrita-
tion in the past. Despite this testimony, Congress included 
provisions in the EAA that go beyond the limits set by generally 
recognized principles of intemational law.50 
Nevertheless, the status in international law of the 1982 oil and 
gas export controls, as well as other potential extraterritorial actions 
44. See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); United States v. James-
Robinson, 515 F. Supp. 1340, 1342 (S.D. Fla. 1981). 
45. The Over the Top, S F.2d 838, 842 (D. Conn. 1925); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita 
Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161, 1179 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (quoting The Over the Top, S F.2d 
838, at 842). 
46. See Leasco Data Processing Equip. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir. 1972). 
41. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT,supra note 26, § 3, co=entj. ("[i]fthere is domestic legisla-
tion contrary to international law that is also pertinent, courts in the United States will nor• 
mally apply the legislation."). 
48. Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804), This rule 
of construction has retained its vitality for nearly two centuries and is firmly entrenched in 
American law. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacionale de Marineros de Honduras, 372 
U.S. 10, 21-22 (1963); Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957); RE-
STATEMENT, supra noie 26, § 3. One of the principal arguments advanced by attorneys for 
Dresser France, a French corporation ordered not to export oil and gas equipment to the 
Soviet Union by the export controls of June, 1982, was that Congress had not clearly expressed 
its intent to violate international law in the EAA. See Memorandum of Points of Authorities 
in Support of Motion for Temporary Restraining Order 15, Dresser Indus. v. Baldridge 
(D.D.C. Aug. 24, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Dresser Memorandum]. 
49. See, e.g., Use of Export Controls and Export Credits For Foreign Policy Purposes: Hear-
ings Before the Commillee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 
(1978) (testimony of George Ball noting "outrage" in Canada over action by the United States 
to control subsidiary of American corporation based in Canada); Extension and Revisions of the 
Export Administration Act Hearings Before the Commillee on Foreign Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 489 (noting that countries are offended by reexport controls). On the subject of American 
attempts to interfere with Canadian subsidiaries of American corporations, see generally Cor-
coran, The Trading With the Enemy Act and the Controlled Canadian Corpora/ion, 14 McGILL 
LJ. 174 (1968). See also Abbott, supra note 13, at 839-49. 
SO. Part II of this Note argues that the legislative intent to control foreign subsidiaries of 
American corporations as well as goods and technology that are not physically located in the 
United States, set forth in Part I, violates international law in several instances. 
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under the EAA, is important for several reasons. First, international 
law affects the policy calculus itself.51 Not only do nations, includ-
ing ours, have a policy interest in the effectiveness of the interna-
tional legal system,52 but the effectiveness of a policy measure may 
depend on its consistency with international law. Extraterritorial ac-
tion has created a tremendous amount of diplomatic tension, 53 a fric-
tion intensified by perceptions of illegality.54 Alienation among the 
members of the Atlantic alliance, for example, is a policy cost whose 
magnitude increased significantly because of the perceived illegality 
of the extraterritorial aspects of the export controls. 55 
Second, legal disputes concerning the extraterritorial application 
of the EAA have arisen,56 and will continue to arise, in jurisdictions 
where international law is dispositive or influential.57 In these juris-
51. See, e.g., L. HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 92-95 (2d ed. 1979) ("In fact, law and 
policy are not in meaningful contrast, and their relation is not simple, whether in domestic or 
international society. All law is an instrument of policy, broadly conceived .... International 
law, too, serves policy, and the policies are not too different from the domestic: order and 
stability, peace, independence, justice, welfare."). 
52. See LJSSITZYN, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 5-6 (1951): 
[T]he principal sanctions of international law ... are the disadvantages incurred by its 
breach, including the termination of the relations regulated by it and retaliation. . . . 
[S)ince the stronger nations have a preponderant influence in the development of some 
rules of international law, they often find it advantageous to support the observance of 
such rules. These sanctions are reinforced by the principles of moral obligation and go~d 
faith, the influence of public opinion, the advantages of a reputation for integrity and fair 
dealing, and the force of habit. 
53. For a sample of the diplomatic protests engendered by the Soviet oil and gas equip-
ment controls, see note 14 supra. q. A. NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA 365-72 (2d ed. 1970) (The author discusses the protests by foreign nations 
of the extraterritorial application of American antitrust laws.). 
54. See notes 14-19 supra. While the legal emphasis of the EEC protest provides some 
evidence of the importance of how the international lawfulness of extraterritorial sanctions 
may affect the policy calculus, the timing of the protest provides stronger evidence of the rela-
tionship between the alienation of NATO allies and the perceived illegality of United States 
policy. That serious European protests followed the extraterritorial extension of sanctions al-
ready applied to American companies strongly suggests that the intrusion on sovereignty, 
rather than effective interference with the project itself, provoked the response of America's 
allies. 
55. See, e.g., Ball, The Case Against Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 12, 1982 at 63, 126 
("Nothing could more help the Soviet Union than a bitter argument within the alliance that 
would weaken the cohesion of the West."); Stem, Specters and Pipe l)reams, 48 FOREIGN 
Po_LICY 21, 3~,(1982) (''The extension of the pipeline sanctions has created a major rift in the 
alliance. . • . ). 
56. See, e.g., Compagnie Europeene des Petroles S.A. V. Sensor Nederland B.V., No. 
82/716 (Dist. Ct. The Hague Sept. 17, 1982), cited in Petitioner's Memorandum in Support of 
Motion to Vacate Order Temporarily Denying Export Privileges, at Exhibit G, In the Matter 
of John Brown Engg. Ltd., International Trade Administration, Oct. 1, 1982 [hereinafter cited 
as John Brown memorandum] (In this case international law was applied and the court con-
cluded that the American Export Controls violated international law and would not be given 
effect in the Netherlands.). 
57. The power of international law vis-a-vis domestic law varies from country to country. 
In Great Britain, for example, international law has no force until it is specifically "incorpo-
rated" into the laws of Britain by an act of Parliament. See I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF 
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 45-53 (3d ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as I. BROWNLIE). In the 
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dictions, which exercise effective power over American subsidiaries 
located in their territory, the character of a future export control 
under international law may determine whether the subsidiary can 
lawfully comply with the EAA. 
Finally, a showing that extraterritorial action under the EAA 
contravenes international law could provide impetus for legislative 
action,58 or international agreements59 to block extraterritorial juris-
diction. The EAA undergoes congressional review in 1983,60 and the 
tenuousness of the claim to extraterritorial jurisdiction coupled with 
the related policy costs of the the pipeline sanctions may persuade 
the Congress to amend the EAA to prevent future extraterritorial 
action that violates international law. Given these concerns, the 
Note proceeds to analyze the possible grounds of jurisdiction which 
might support the extraterritorial application of the Act. 
B. The EAA and Generally Recognized Principles of Jurisdiction in 
International Law 
The most fundamental precept of international law - indeed, 
"the basic constitutional doctrine of the law of nations"61 - recog-
United States, on the other hand, international law is part of the law of the land and will be 
given effect unless it is contrary to an act of Congress. See L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND 
THE CONSTITUTION 221 (1972). See also notes 44-48 supra. Italy is an example of a state where 
a constitutional mandate dictates that domestic laws must conform with the principles of inter-
national law. I. BROWNLIE, id. Given the divergent status of international law in various 
countries, the locus of the litigation would determine the relative importance of international 
law in a dispute over export controls. 
58. Past assertions by the United States of extraterritorial jurisdiction have led to legisla-
tion in other countries designed to block what these countries believe to be violations of inter-
national law and infringements of territorial sovereignty. Thus, a number of foreign states 
have enacted "blocking" or "claw-back" statutes designed to protect their citizens from asser-
tions of extraterritorial jurisdiction by the United States. See Note, Foreign Non-disclosure 
Laws and .Domestic .Discovery Orders in Antitrust Litigation, 88 YALE L.J. 612, 613 (1979). See 
also Herzog, The 1980 French Law on .Documents and Information, 15 AM. J. INTL, L. 382 
(1981); Lowe, Blocking Extratellitorial Jurisdiction: The British Protection of Trading Interests 
Act, 1980, 15 AM. J. INTL. L. 257 (1981); Note, Enjoining the Application of the British Protec-
tion of Trading Interest Act in Private American Antitrust Litigation, 19 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1574 
(1981). The British Protection of Trading Interests Act was invoked to order British compa-
nies not to comply with the American directives in the Soviet pipeline case. See note 18 supra 
and accompanying text. 
59. Nations have developed sensible rules to resolve international economic disputes that 
have arisen due to conflicts of jurisdiction. See, e.g., Convention for the Avoidance of Double 
Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income, July 22, 1954, United States-Federal Republic of 
Germany, 5 U.S.T. 2768, T.I.A.S. No. 3133; Leich, The Australian-United Stales Agreement 
on Cooperation in Antitrust Matters,16 AM. J. INTL. L. 866 (1982) (I'his agreement is designed 
to minimize jurisdictional conflicts by providing for consultation and possible modifications of 
policies.). 
60. Wash. Post, Jan. 15, 1982, § A, at 2, col. I (discussing the political battle over the 
renewal of the EAA. See also Wall St. J., April 5, 1983, § I, at 3, col. 2 (discussing President 
Reagan's proposal for the renewal of the EAA and a strengthening of presidential power over 
exports). 
61. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 57, at 286 (3d. ed. 1979). 
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nizes the sovereign62 and equal status of the nations comprising the 
international community.63 As a function ofthis status, nations are 
generally considered to possess rights of independence, territorial 
supremacy, and personal supremacy.64 Territorial supremacy is a 
state's power to "exercise supreme authority over all persons and 
things" within its territory; personal supremacy is the state's power 
"to exercise supreme authority over its citizens at home and 
abroad."65 
As a corollary to territorial supremacy, each state has jurisdiction 
over acts committed within its territory and over the permanent pop-
ulation living therein.66 This ''territorial principle" provides that a 
state has absolute dominion and control over all individuals and 
property within its borders,67 including an unchallenged right to reg-
ulate corporations within its territory.68 As the United States 
Supreme Court declared at an early date: "The jurisdiction of a na-
tion within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It 
is susceptible to no limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction 
upon it . . . from an external source, would imply a diminution of its 
sovereignty .... "69 
Territorial jurisdiction is closely related to the concepts of territo-
rial integrity70 and nonintervention.71 While territorial jurisdiction 
gives the state the right72 to prescribe or enforce a rule of law within 
its territory, the latter concepts impose a duty on other states to re-
frain generally from any act that infringes on the territorial 
supremacy of a state,73 including any action that interferes with the 
62. Although the term "sovereignty" lacks a precise definition, it is used to describe the 
"whole body of rights and attributes which a state possesses in its territory, to the exclusion of 
all other states, and also in its relations with other states." The Corfu Channel Case, 1949 
I.C.J. 39, 43 (separate opinion of Alvarez, J.) (emphasis added). 
63. 1949 I.C.J. 39. 
64. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 286 (H. Laughterpach 8th ed. 1955) [hereinaf-
ter cited as L. OPPENHEIM]. 
65. Id. 
66. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 57, at 287. 
67. See, e.g., G. SCHWARTZENBERGER & E. BROWN, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
72-78 (1976); 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 64, at 325; 5 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 183-86 (1965) [hereinafter cited as M. WHITEMAN]. 
68. 5 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 67, at 288. 
69. Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812). 
70. The right of territorial integrity possessed by a state gives it the prerogative to demand 
that other states abstain from committing any act that constitutes a violation of the indepen-
dence or territorial supremacy of that state. 5 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 67, at 321-902 (1965). 
71. Nonintervention is the duty of a state under international law not to interfere with the 
internal and external affairs of another state. 5 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 67, 321-702 (1965). 
Extraterritorial actions are unlawful if they interfere with the duty of nonintervention. I. 
BROWNLIE, supra note 57, at 309. 
72. 5 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 67, at 216; F. MANN, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 
(1973) [hereinafter cited as F. MANN]. 
73. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 64, at 288; I. BROWNLIE, supra note 57, at 287, 289-91; 5 
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domestic relations or international intercourse of another nation.74 
A state's attempts to enforce its laws extraterritorially may violate 
this duty,75 and give rise to a cause of action for the states adversely 
affected.76 
Although a state's right to territorial jurisdiction is frequently 
phrased in exclusive terms, some exceptions have evolved and are 
now generally accepted in international law.77 But as assertions of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction typically risk interference with the terri-
torial integrity of other nations - and at the same time provide a 
precedent for such nations to engage in similar interference - the 
evolution of these exceptions has provoked serious controversy,78 
and the accepted scope of the exceptions remains rather limited.79 
Customary practice among states confirms the need for limiting prin-
ciples to preserve the core notion of territorial jurisdiction: even 
those states taking the most expansionist view of extraterritorial ju-
risdiction have generally recognized these concerns. so 
M. WHITEMAN,supra note 67, at 187 (citing Article 11 of the Convention on Rights and Duties 
of States). 
74. 1 L. OPPENHEIM supra note 64, at 288; I. BROWNLIE, supra note S7, at 287 (The corol-
lary to independence and equality of states is the duty of nonintervention). 
7S. RESTATEMENT, supra note 26, at §§ 8, 3(1); F. MANN, supra note 72, 110-39 ("(T]he 
first and foremost restriction imposed on a state is that - failing the existence of a permissive 
rule to the contrary - it may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another 
state") (quoting from the case of the S.S. Lotus, France v. Turkey, 1927 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10, 
at 18 (Judgment of Sept. 7), 2 World Ct. Rep. 20 (193S)); I. BROWNLIE, supra note S7, at 306-07 
(''The governing principle is that a state cannot take measures on the territory of another state 
by way of enforcement of national laws without the consent of the latter".). 
16. See HENKIN, PUGH, SCHACTER & SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW S56 (1980) ("lfa state 
by its act or omission breaches an international obligation, it incurs international responsibil-
ity. If the consequence is an injury to another state, the delinquent state is responsible to make 
reparation or give satisfaction for the breach to the injured state."). See generally S M. WHITE· 
MAN, supra note 67, at 6-7 (discussing correlative rights and duties: "For every right there is a 
correlative duty and for every wrong there should be a remedy."). 
77. The principal exceptions according to one major study are: 
(1) the nationality principle, under which a state can exercise jurisdiction over its nation-
als anywhere in the world, 
(2) the protective principle, under which a state can attach legal consequences to conduct 
outside its territory that threatens the state's national security, 
(3) the universality principle, under which states can exercise jurisdiction over certain 
offenses, such as piracy, that are universally prohibited, and 
(4) the passive personality principle; under which a state can exercise jurisdiction over the 
offense due to the nationality of the victim. 
Research in International Law: Jurisdiction with Respect lo Crime, 29 AM. J. INTL. L. 443 
(Supp. I 193S). Accord, Rivard v. United States, 37S F.2d 882, 88S (5th Cir.), cert. denied 
Groleau v. United States, 389 U.S. 884 (1967). See generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 26, at 
§ 40. One other exception that is not generally recognized by a majority of nations but is 
gaining wider acceptance is the "effects" or "objective territorial principle," discussed at notes 
112-2S infra and accompanying text. 
78. See, e.g., note 118 infra and accompanying text. 
19. See notes 86-94, 98-99, 117, 129, 131-33 infra and accompanying text. 
80. See Jennings, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the United States Antitrust Laws, 19S7 
BRIT. Y.B. INTL. L. 146, ISO [hereinafter cited as Jennings]: 
Are we to conclude then that extraterritorial jurisdiction is a matter left within the discre-
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The extraterritorial application of the EAA calls into question 
the scope of these exceptions. As this application involves foreign 
subsidiaries and licensees acting within the territory of other sover-
eign nations, it may impermissibly intrude on the right of territorial 
jurisdiction and violate the United States' duty to respect the territo-
rial integrity of these nations. For example, in the Soviet pipeline 
case the United States sought to interfere with the domestic relations 
and international intercourse of the EEC countries by attempting to 
enforce export controls and curtail export activities that were legal in 
the EEC countries. The remainder of this section considers whether 
such interference is sustainable under three principles of extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction: the nationality principle, the objective territorial 
principle, and the protective principle. 
1. Jurisdiction Under the Nationality Principle 
The most important exception to the territorial principle of juris-
diction under international law is the nationality principle. The na-
tionality principle allows a country to proscribe81 conduct of its 
tion of each sovereign State; that it is not governed by international law? The practice of 
States leans against such a conclusion. For the fact is that States do not give themselves 
unlimited discretion in the matter. Their municipal laws - even those of States which 
make extensive claims of extraterritorial jurisdiction - contain principles of jurisdiction 
such as the nationality principle, the protection principle, the universality principle and 
the like. It seems reasonable to infer from the existence of these principles of extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction, firmly entrenched as they are in the practice of States, that some justify-
ing principle is thought to be necessary to found extraterritorial jurisdiction; that it is not a 
matter of sovereign discretion. 
The position taken by the United States, which has one of the broadest views of extraterri-
torial jurisdiction, is illustrative. While recognizing exceptions to territorial jurisdiction, the 
United States has not rejected the common law's "preference for the territorial basis of juris-
diction." RESTATEMENT, supra note 26, at § 33 reporter's note. See RESTATEMENT OF THE 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (Revised) § 402, comment b (Tent. Draft 
No. 2, 1981) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT (Revised)].("In general, territoriality is con-
sidered the normal, and nationality the exceptional, basis for the exercise of jurisdiction."). 
This position is reflected in judicial attempts to limit the application of principles permitting 
extraterritorial jurisdiction. See, e.g., notes 121 (RESTATEMENT'S attempt to limit 'objective 
territorial principle) and 131-33 (limits on protective principle) i'!fra. It is also reflected in 
American jurisprudence's growing acceptance of a balancing approach, under which the 
United States must consider the interests of other nations - including their interest in territo-
rial supremacy - prior to extraterritorial application of United States law, even if such an 
application can be validated under a generally accepted jurisdictional basis. See notes 136, 
139-41 i'!fra. 
81. RESTATEMENT, supra note 26, at§§ 6-7, distinguishes two types of jurisdiction, juris-
diction to prescribe and jurisdiction to enforce: 
Jurisdiction to prescribe signifies a state's authority to enact laws governing the conduct, 
relations, status or interests of persons or things, whether by legislation, executive act or 
order, or administrative rule or regulation. Jurisdiction to enforce, by contrast, describes a 
state's authority to compel compliance or impose sanctions for noncompliance with its 
administrative or judicial orders. 
F.T.C. v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 1980) 
(footnotes omitted). 
Although a state cannot eeforce a rule of law within the territory of another state because 
that would violate the other state's sovereignty and the duty of nonintervention, there are 
circumstances in which a state can validly prescribe a rule of law that attaches legal conse-
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citizens anywhere in the world and is often used to support extrater-
ritorial actions. 82 The extraterritorial action taken under section six 
of the EAA was based in large part on the nationality principle. 83 
While the rules governing the nationality of corporations are not yet 
settled, and there appear to be virtually no rules of international law 
governing the nationality of goods or technology, this exception fur-
nishes at best extremely weak support for the extraterritorial exten-
sion of the EAA. 
a. Nationality of subsidiaries. The principles governing the na-
tionality of corporations have been described as "unsettled"84 or 
more precisely as a "haphazard melange made of scraps of national 
rules stuck together. . . ."85 The traditional common law rule at-
tributes to a corporation the nationality of the state of incorpora-
tion, 86 while the well-settled rule in civil jurisdictions decides the 
nationality of a company according to its "seat" (siege socia/)81 -
ie., the principal place of business or the location of the company's 
central administrative offices. 88 The most important pronouncement 
quences for actions taken in other countries. The following fact pattern describes one situation 
where there is no jurisdiction to enforce the rule oflaw, yet there is jurisdiction to prescribe the 
rule: 
X is a national of state A residing in state B. State A has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of 
law subjecting X to punishment if he fails to return to A for military service. X does not 
return. A has no jurisdiction to eeforce its rule by action against X in the territory of B 
even though it has jurisdiction to prescribe such a rule. 
RESTATEMENT, supra note 26, at § 7 comment a, illustration I. It must be emphasized that 
under international law a state does not have jurisdiction to enforce a rule of law unless it has 
jurisdiction to prescribe the conduct in question. See note 108 infra. 
82. See I. BROWNLIE, supra note 57, at 303. 
83. See note 5 supra (fhe United States attempted to assert jurisdiction over foreign sub-
sidiaries by attributing to the subsidiaries the nationality of the entity that owned or controlled 
the subsidiary.). 
84. Craig, Application of the Trading With the Enemy Act to Foreign Corporations Ow11ed by 
Americans: Reflections on Fruehaufv. Massardy, 83 HARV. L. REV. 579, 589 (1970) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Craig]. 
85. Vagts, The Global Corporation in International Law, 6 J. INTL. LAW & EcoN. 247, 247 
(1972). 
86. See 17 w. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS,§ 8300 
(rev. perm. ed. 1977) ("It is a settled general rule that insofar as a corporation can be regarded 
as a citizen . . • of any state or country, it is a citizen . . • of the state or country by or under 
the laws of which it was created • . . . it is equally well settled • • . that a corporation has its 
legal domicile in the country or state by or under whose laws it was created"); W. BISHOP, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 488 (3d. ed. 1971); 2 E. RABEL, THE CONFLICT 
OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 31 (2d ed. 1960) [hereinafter cited as E. RABEL]. See gener-
ally Hadari, The Choice of National Law Applicable to the Multinatio11al Enterprise a11d the 
Nationality of Such Enterprises, 1974 DuKE L.J. 1 (1974) (fhe author discusses the traditional 
approaches to corporate nationality, including advantages and disadvantages of each, and 
demonstrates how national interests with respect to specific laws change the traditional rules. 
He also proposes a new flexible test for determining nationality). 
87. W. FRIEDMAN, 0. LISSITZVN, & R. PUGH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 513 (1969) [hereinafter cited as w. FREIDMAN, 0. LISSITZYND & R. PUGH]. 
88. Many factors are used in different jurisdictions to determine the "seat" of a corpora-
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by the International Court of Justice on the nationality of a corpora-
tion for purposes of international law states that a corporation is a 
national of the state under the laws of which it was incorporated and 
in whose territory it has its registered office. 89 This rule was followed 
in a Dutch case during the Soviet pipeline controversy.9° Further-
more, a recent United States Supreme Court case held that a wholly 
owned Japanese subsidiary incorporated in New York was an Amer-
ican corporation and had to comply with American civil rights 
laws.91 It should also be noted that the United States has consistently 
adhered to the state of incorporation test in its commercial treaties 
with other countries92 and that recent trade embargoes have ex-
empted foreign subsidiaries from the definition of "person subject to 
the jurisdiction of the United States."93 
According to either of the accepted tests of a corporation's na-
tionality, the American claim of jurisdiction over foreign subsidiar-
ies (or foreign corporations) is invalid under the nationality 
principle.94 As these subsidiaries are neither incorporated under the 
tion. These factors include the corporate headquarters, the place where the board of directors 
meets, or the location of the general meeting of the shareholders. See 2 E. RABEL, supra note 
86, at 40-42. 
89. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., 1970 I.C.J. 3, 41-45 (judgment of Feb. 5). 
The issue presented was whether Belgium could exercise a right of protection for shareholders 
of Belgian nationality in a corporation created under the laws of Canada and having its pri-
mary place of business in Spain. After noting that there were no well established principles in 
the area, the court held that a country where the shareholders were located could not assert 
diplomatic protection because the corporation was not a national of that state. The proper 
state(s) to assert diplomatic protection is (are) the states where the corporation is incorporated 
and where it has its registered office. Under this rationale any EAA regulations that attempt to 
control the activities of foreign subsidiaries of American corporations would be invalid under 
the nationality principle. 
90. Compagnie Europeene des Petroles v. Sensor Nederland B.V., No. 82/716 (Dist Ct. 
The Hague, September 17, 1982) (unofficial translation provided in Exhibit G, John Brown 
memorandum, supra note 56) (holding that an American subsidiary incorporated and having 
its principal place of business in the Netherlands is a Dutch corporation). 
91. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 102 S. Ct. 2374 (1982). 
92. U.S. co=ercial treaties "provide that a company's national status shall be determined 
by its place of incorporation and this test 'has been found acceptable by all countries with 
which the U.S. has signed co=erical treaties since ... '" World War II. W. FRIEDMAN, 0. 
LISSITZYN, & R. PUGH,supra note 87, at 513 (quoting R. WILSON, UNITED STATES COMMER-
CIAL TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1960)). See, e.g., Franco American Treaty of Es-
tablishment, Nov. 25, 1959, art xiv, para. 5, 11 U.S.T. 2398, 2416, T.I.A.S. No. 4625. 
93. See Abbott, supra note 13, at 782, 840 n.604, 843-49, (noting that recent export embar-
goes relating to Uganda, Afghanistan, the Moscow Olympics and the Iranian hostage crisis did 
not purport to control foreign subsidiaries of American corporations); Berman & Garson, 
supra note 22, at 869 (noting decision not to control subsidiaries in Cuban assets control 
regulations). 
94. It should be noted that even if the United States could assert jurisdiction over subsidi-
aries based on the nationality principle, it is generally recognized that in a conflict between the 
territorial principle and the nationality principle, the territorial principle controls. See L. OP-
PENHEIM, supra note 64, at 288. Moreover, the United States still could not enforce its rule of 
law in the territory of another sovereign even if it could prescribe for subsidiaries. See note 81 
supra. 
1324 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 81:1308 
laws of the United States nor have their "seat" inside the United 
States, they are not American nationals. Even though Congress in-
tended the President to have the power under the EAA to control the 
exports of foreign subsidiaries, this assertion of jurisdiction cannot 
be justified by the nationality principle. 
b. Nationality of goods and technology. With the exception of 
airplanes,95 ships,96 and possibly historical cultural artifacts,97 there 
are no rules of international law governing the nationality of goods. 
The extraterritorial reach of the United States to licensees of Ameri-
can technology, and to those using American-made goods in the pro-
duction of other goods, based on its claim that its exports are 
unalterably American, has been rejected by at least two foreign 
courts98 and has no accepted basis in intemational law.99 
Initially, attributing any nationality to inanimate objects poses 
formidable conceptual difficulties. 100 International law has devel-
oped the idea of nationality almost exclusively in the context of indi-
95. Aircraft have the nationality of the state where they are registered. Convention on 
International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, art. 17, 61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. No. 1591, 15 U.N.T.S, 
295, reprinted in w. FRIEDMAN, 0. LISSl1ZYN & R. PUGH, supra note 87, at 630. 
96. Ships have the nationality of the state whose flag they fly if there is a "genuine link" 
(i.e., the state controls the technical and social matters of the ship) between the ship and the 
state. Id. 
91. See Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and 
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, 10 INTL. LEGAL MATERIALS 289 (1971 ). See gener-
ally Marcuss & Richard,Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in United States Trade Law: The Need for 
a Consistent Theory, 20 CoLUM. J. OF TRANSNATL. L. 439, 480 (1981) [hereinafter cited as 
Marcuss & Richard]. 
98. See American President Lines v. China Mut. Trading Co., 1953 A.M.C. 1510, 1526 
(Hong Kong Sup. Ct.) (Goods are no longer under American jurisdiction once they are dis-
charged.); Moens v. Ahlers Am. Lloyd, 30 R.W. 360 (Tribunal of Commerce Antwerp 1965), 
99. The EEC rejected this claim in the Soviet pipeline case, stating that "[g]oods and tech• 
nology do not have any nationality and there are no known rules for using goods or technol-
ogy situated abroad as a basis of establishing jurisdiction over the persons controlling them." 
EEC Co=ents on U.S. Regulations, supra note 14, at 894. 
Under United States law, the closest analogy to the jurisdiction asserted in the Soviet pipe• 
line case is that of actions in rem. But a state can only base jurisdiction on property, either in 
rem or quasi in rem, if the res is in the territory of the state asserting jurisdiction. See 4 C, 
WRIGHT /k, A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 1070 (1969), 
100. International agreements and scholarly commentary have universally spoken in terms 
of "nationals," i.e., persons, when describing the concept of nationality and its relevance to 
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of National-
ity Laws, Apr. 12, 1930, 179 L.N.T.S. 89 (no suggestion that entities other than persons can 
have status as "nationals"); Sahovic & Bishop, The Authority of the Slate: Its Range With 
Respect lo Persons and Places, in MANUAL OF PuBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 311, at 360-62 (M, 
Sorensen ed. 1978) (discussing nationality as a basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction without 
any suggestion that nationality might attach to entities other than persons). While to some 
extent artificial, assigning nationality to corporations reflects, fundamentally, their legal per-
sonhood - the ability to make decisions with legal consequences. The focus on the location of 
various corporate decisionmaking functions in the nationality inquiry confirms this distinction. 
Mere objects, by contrast, cannot make decisions, owe allegiance, or otherwise act as legal 
persons who might be described as "nationals." 
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vidual persons, according to principles inapplicable to commercial 
goods.101 To argue by these principles against territorial jurisdiction 
over goods and technology leads to exceedingly anomalous results. 
The central political consequence of nationality is allegiance; 102-ma-
chinery owes allegiance to nobody. To assert that inanimate objects 
somehow do owe allegiance to their country of origin - that they 
are "unalterably American" - compounds the paradox. What, for 
example, is the "nationality" of pipeline equipment manufactured in 
the United States from raw materials or components imported from 
other nations? 
The· serious assertion of so expansive a view of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction risks the creation of an unmanageable precedent. The 
notion that goods have an unalterable nationality would permit na-
tions to prescribe regulations for the resale of their export commocli-
ties in other countries. Such a result would enormously complicate 
the already difficult areas where different nations press competing 
claims to jurisdiction, such as the regulation of anticompetitive 
practices.103 
To the extent principles governing the nationality of individuals 
rationally relate to jurisdiction over goods, the international law of 
nationality reinforces the territorial principle. The "dominant na-
tionality" principle relied on in cases of competing claims to the na-
tionality of individuals accords great importance to residence104 as 
reflecting the "real and effective nationality."105 Claims of extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction over goods and technology thus contravene the 
nationality principle relied upon to justify the derogation of the terri-
torial principle. . 
In the usual case where exporters seek to export restricted goods 
under the EAA, they are req-qired to provide ''written assurances" 
that the final destination or use of the goods or technology is not 
101. See, e.g., Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala) 1955 I.C.J. 4 ("According to 
the practice of States, to arbitral and judicial decisions and to the opinions of writers, national-
ity is a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of 
existence, interests and sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights and du-
ties."). Identifying any "genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments" between the 
United States and compressor equipment located in a foreign nation defies ordinary powers of 
analogy. 
102. See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 436 (1932) (fhe defendant, charged with 
criminal contempt for refusing to return from overseas upon being summoned to testify in a 
criminal case, "was, and continues to be, a citizen of the United Sta,tes. He continued to owe 
allegiance to the United States. By virtue of the obligations of citizenship, the United States 
retained its authority over him, and he was bound by its laws made applicable to him in a 
foreign country."). 
103. See notes 77-79 supra. 
104. See Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), 1955 I.C.J. 4; United States ex 
rel Merge v. Italian Republic, 14 R. Intl. Arb. Awards 236 (1955). 
105. Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), 1955 I.C.J. 4. 
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prohibited by the EAA.106 In these cases it has been argued that the 
exporters and their clients have voluntarily submitted to the jurisdic-
tion of the United States and that the U.S. Government can impose 
extraterritorial restrictions since it could deny export privileges com-
pletely if it chose to do so. Thus, the written assurance might make 
the goods, and those entities possessing the goods, subject to Ameri-
can jurisdiction.101 
This argument is unpersuasive. First, the mere fact that an ex-
porter and a foreign importer agree that they will not reexport a 
product in violation of the regulations does not constitute submission 
to the jurisdiction of the United States wherever they or the goods 
may be. The United States may have a cause of action against the 
parties- and may be able to enforce its rights if the goods or parties 
are present in the United States or if the United States can gain the 
cooperation of the relevant foreign states108 - but this does not 
mean that the United States has authority under international law to 
enforce such regulations extraterritorially. Second, there is good 
reason to doubt a private party's authority voluntarily to subject 
property that is located in another country to the jurisdiction of the 
United States. Since application of the Act derogates the sovereignty 
of the territorial state rather than that of the contracting party, the 
party's consent does not confer jurisdiction on the United States. In 
American jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has drawn an analogy 
between domestic jurisdictional principles and those found in inter-
national law .109 Under those principles, the "parties cannot waive 
lack of [subject matter] jurisdiction by express consent, by conduct, 
or even by estoppel .... " 110 The rationale behind this rule is that 
jurisdictional concerns are too fundamental in our federal system to 
be left to the ''whims" of the litigants. This rationale applies even 
more forcefully in the international arena, where jurisdictional issues 
involve claims of competing sovereigns to dominion and control 
over the goods within their territory. These are legitimate interests 
of sovereign states and should not be subject to waiver by private 
parties. 111 
106. See 15 C.F.R. §§ 379.4(1), 379.8(a)(3) (1982). 
107. Marcuss & Richard, supra note 97, at 478. 
108. The United States can only enforce its rights !fit had a valid basis to proscribe the 
conduct in question. See, e.g., Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882, 885 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. 
denied, Grobeau v. United States, 389 U.S. 884 (1967). The mere physical presence of the 
defendants within the United States does not give the court subject matter jurisdiction unless 
the rule oflaw was validly prescribed. United States v. Keller, 451 F. Supp. 631,634 (D. P.R. 
1978). The generally recognized-principles of jurisdiction under which a state can prescribe a 
rule of law are discussed at notes 67, 77 supra and accompanying text. 
109. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877). 
llO. 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 3522, at 46-47 (1975). 
111. The voluntary submission argument is especially weak in the Soviet Pipeline situation 
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2. Jurisdiction Under the Objective Territorial Principle 
American jurisprudence has taken the position that "any state 
may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, 
for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its bor-
ders which the state reprehends."112 This principle, which is known 
as the "objective territorial principle" or the "effects doctrine," has 
been widely used by American courts as a basis for jurisdiction in 
cases involving antitrust law, 113 criminal law, 114 and securities 
regulation. 115 
Although jurisdiction under this principle has some basis in in-
ternational law, 116 the American position 117 has been subject to con-
siderable criticism.118 Much of this criticism stems from concern 
because the restrictions on goods and technology were imposed efter they had left the territo-
rial jurisdiction of the United States. Consequently, it cannot be said that companies import-
ing these goods or technology had voluntarily consented to American jurisdiction. In fact, 
some companies, such as General Electric, inquired about export controls before they exported 
the goods and were told by government officials that there were none. See John Brown Mem-
orandum, supra note 56, at Exhibit 2. 
112. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945). 
113. See, e.g., Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 703-
08 (1962); United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., 133 F. Supp. 
40 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., 100 F. Supp. 504, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 
1951). 
114. See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 609 F.2d 134 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Fer-
nandez, 496 F.2d 1294 (5th Cir. 1974). 
115. See, e.g., Leasco Data Processing Equip. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972); 
SEC v. Kasser, 391 F. Supp. 1167 (D.N.J. 1975). 
116. See Case of the S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J., Ser. A., No. IO, 19-23 
(Judgment of Sept. 7), 2 World Ct. Rep. 20 (1935) ("[M)any countries ... interpret criminal 
law in the sense that offenses, the authors of which at the moment of commission of [the crime] 
are in the territory of another state, are nevertheless to be regarded as having been committed 
in the national territory, if one of the constituent elements of the offense, and more especially 
its effects, have taken place there ...• ") (emphasis added). 
117. Other countries have adopted the American approach in certain instances. See W. 
FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS 36-37 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter w. 
FUGATE]; Jacobs, Extraterritorial Application of Competition Laws: An English View, 13 INTL. 
LAW. 645, 648 (1979). For an example of a case where the EEC has applied the effects princi-
ple, see Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. E.C. Comm., 1972 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 557. But the 
objective territorial principle probably continues to enjoy the support of only a minority of 
states. See l L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 64, at 331. 
118. See generally Sonarajah, The Extraterritorial Enforcement of U.S. Antitrust Laws: 
Conflict and Compromise, 31 INTL. & COMP. L.Q. 127 (1982); Riedwig, The Extra-Territorial 
Application of Restrictive Trade Legislation-Jurisdiction and International Law, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AssoClATION, REPORT OF THE FIFTY-FIRST CONFERENCE 351, 372-73 (1964) 
("Nearly all European writers have been critical of the Restatement's notion of extraterritorial 
application of a state's laws to aliens. The European Advisory Committee on the Restatement 
• • • criticized the Restatement rule of extraterritorial jurisdiction stating: 
"In our view the exercise of jurisdiction based on territory is not justified in cases where 
all that has occurred within the territory is the effects of certain conduct and not the least 
part of the conduct itself." 
Jennings, supra note 80, at 159-60; Becker, The Antitrust Law and Relations with Foreign Na-
tions, DEPT. STATE BULL. 72-73 (1959) (discussing passionate belief among many of America's 
allies that the effects principle as applied in American cases violates international law and 
infringes on their sovereignty). 
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about its potentially limitless scope. 119 The various attempts to de-
velop limits are generally couched in somewhat ambiguous terms 
and hence do not completely blunt the force of this objection.120 Il-
lustrative is the formulation by the Restatement (Second) of Foreign 
Relations Law, wJ:iich specifies that a state has jurisdiction to attach 
"legal consequences to conduct that occurs outside its territory and 
causes an effect within its territory," if the effect is direct, foresee-
able, and substantial. Furthermore, the rule must not be "inconsis-
tent with the principles of justice generally recognized by states that 
have reasonably developed legal systems." 121 
Even if one accepts this formulation as a valid basis for jurisdic-
tion under international law, extraterritorial application of the EAA 
typically cannot be justified on this ground. In most situations to 
which the EAA might be applied, there is no tangible effect within the 
United States, let alone a substantial one. Instead, any effect is most 
likely to be on the United States' rather amorphous perceptions of its 
national security or foreign policy interests. To suggest that effects 
such as these constitute effects within the United States would 
largely eviscerate the concept of territorial integrity. 122 This result 
cannot be reconciled with the theoretical justification for the objec-
tive territorial principle, which is simply to expand the notion of 
when conduct occurs within a territory, rather than to eliminate no-
tions of territoriality altogether. 123 
119. See, e.g., Akehurst, Jurisdiction in International Law, (1972-73) BRIT. Y.B. INTL. L. 
145, 154 (describing objective territorial principle as "a slippery slope which leads away from 
the territorial principle toward universal jurisdiction"); Jennings, supra note 80, at 159 ("If 
indeed it were permissible to found objective territorial jurisdiction upon the territoriality of 
more or less remote repercussions of an act wholly performed in another territory, then there 
were virtually no limit to a State's territorial jurisdiction."). 
120. For an illustration of these attempts, see Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 
549 F.2d 597, 611-12 (9th Cir. 1976) (The court states that there is no consensus on the formu-
lation of the objective territorial principle and cites many different formulations in case law 
and by commentators.). See generally 1 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMER!· 
CAN BUSINESS ABROAD 142-81 (2d ed. 1981) (tracing the development of the objective territo-
rial principle and attempting to reach some conclusion about the current status of the law). 
Despite some efforts to limit this principle, American cases rarely analyze the type of effect that 
is required for jurisdiction. Courts seem to assume that the effect is "intuitively obvious." See 
Note, Effects Jurisdiction Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the JJue Process 
Clause, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 474, 504-05 (1980). 
121. RESTATEMENT, supra note 26, at § 18. 
122. The comments of Professors Marcuss and Richard, in their discussion of the protec-
tive principle, are pertinent: "(L]ike the 'effects' doctrine, the protective principle has generated 
concern in the minds of students of international law because of its potentially infinite reach. 
Even a passing familiarity with recent history confirms that '[a) State might have peculiar and 
even outrageous notions of what affects its security or what is a vital interest.' " Marcuss & 
Richard, supra note 97, at 445 (quoting Jennings, supra note 80, at 155). See generally note 
119 supra. 
123. Jennings, supra note 80, at 160: 
Thus it is clear from the authorities that the objective application of the territorial princi-
ple is limited to those "effects" which are direct, if not immediate, and which form a part 
of the actus reus; where, in the language of the older cases, the crime was "consummated", 
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Moreover, any effects within the United States are, at most, indi-
rect. Direct effects are those which have no intervening elements, 
but rather fl.ow in a straight line without deviation or interruption.124 
The direct effect of exports between foreign nations is upon those 
nations (and private parties) who are actually parties to the trade.125 
Any effect on the United States depends on an intervening element, 
namely, the policies of the importing or exporting nation which are 
perceived as a threat to the interests of the United States. 
Finally, to the extent that national security interests do provide a 
basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction, the protective principle offers 
the soundest guidance to determining the scope of the jurisdiction so 
conferred. As the protective principle focuses more directly on na.: 
tional security interests, it provides a more relevant - and poten-
tially limited - means to balance the relevant concerns, than does a 
more general concept of objective territoriality. 
3. Jurisdiction Under the Protective Principle 
The protective principle allows a state to prescribe rules of law 
for conduct outside its territory that threatens its security as a state, 
provided that the conduct is generally recognized as a crime under 
the law of states that have reasonably developed legal systems.126 
This principle has generally been viewed as a "special limited excep-
tion" to jurisdiction based on either nationality or territoriality .127 
viz. completed, in the territory claiming jurisdiction. And, indeed, the same conclusion is 
required by the reason of the thing, for a different conclusion would permit a practically 
unlimited extension of the principle to cover almost any conceivable situation. It would 
be absurd, indeed, if an almost unlimited extraterritorial jurisdiction could be ostensibly 
based upon a territorial principle of jurisdiction. 
124. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 506 F. Supp. 981, 989 (N.D. 
Ill. 1980) (no effect in United States due to breach of contract); Upton v. Empire of Iran, 459 F. 
Supp. 264, 266 (D.D.C. 1978), qffd. mem., 601 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (no direct effect in 
United States from collapse of airport terminal roof in Iran causing American deaths); Carey 
v. National Oil Corp., 453 F. Supp. 1097 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), qffd. per curiam, 592 F.2d 673 (2d 
Cir. 1979) (no direct effect in United States from breaches of petroleum contracts by Libyan 
owned corporation against Bahamian subsidiary of American corporation). But see Ohnthup 
v. Firearms Center Inc., 516 F. Supp. 1281, 1286-87 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (direct, substantial and 
foreseeable effect found due to importation of defective gun that caused physical injury in the 
United States.). 
125. Compagnie Europeene des Petroles v. Sensor Nederland B.V., No. 82/716 (Dist. Ct. 
The Hague Sept. 17, 1982),citedin John Brown memorandum,supra note 56, at Exhibit 6, p. s· 
("[I]t cannot be understood that exports to Russia of goods not originating in the United States 
by a non-American exporter would have any direct or prohibited consequences within the 
United States."). Cf. Marcuss & Richard, supra note 97, at 469 (arguing that effects principle 
could be applied to give jurisdiction in trade regulation cases only if the most "speculative and 
ephemeral effects of foreign conduct" suffice to meet the effects doctrine, but suggesting that if 
doctrine is asserted on national security grounds, courts must make "individual judgments on 
the security impact of particular transactions." Id. at 479). 
126. RESTATEMENT, supra note 26, at § 33. 
127. RESTATEMENT (Revised), supra note 80, § 402, comment a, defines the protective 
principle in very open-ended language: international law permits a state "to exercise jurisdic-
tion to prescribe and apply its law with respect to ... certain conduct outside its territory by 
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The Tentative Restatement of Foreign Relations Law (Revised) enu-
merates espionage, counterfeiting of the state's seal or currency, the 
falsification of official documents, perjury before consular officials, 
and conspiracies to violate the immigration or customs laws as ex-
amples of crimes to which the protective principle might be 
applied. 128 
Although there are no American cases so holding, some circum-
stances may arise in which conduct overseas that threatens American 
national security is subject to American jurisdiction pursuant to the 
protective principle. As the EAA allows the President to control ex-
ports for both national security and foreign policy purposes, 129 the 
extraterritorial application of these controls might be sustained in 
such circumstances. 
As suggested in the preceding discussion of the objective territo-
rial principle, recognition of extraterritorial jurisdiction to protect 
national security interests raises fears that such a doctrine has the 
potential to emasculate notions of territorial integrity.130 The 
breadth of contemporary perceptions of threats to national security 
interests aggravates these apprehensions. For example, any event 
that contributes to the military strength of potentially antagonistic 
nations may adversely affect the security of other states. Alliances 
add to the the scope of activity that might be subject to extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction. To take one illustration, the American perception 
of a threat to European national security caused by reliance on So-
viet gas might correspondingly be perceived as a threat to American 
security as a member of NATO. 
Perhaps in recognition of the protective principle's potential 
breadth, American case law has developed stringent prerequisites to 
assertion of jurisdiction based on this basis. First, the conduct in 
question must generally be recognized as criminal by civilized na-
tions.131 Second, a potential generalized effect - which may or may 
not affect the United States - is insufficient;132 "[a]ll cases which 
have invoked the protective principle [involved] actions where there 
persons not its nationals which is directed against the security of the state or certain state 
interests." Id at § 402(3). 
128. Id, at § 402, co=ent d. 
129. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2404, 2405 (Supp. III 1979). 
130. Jennings, supra note 80, at 155; Marcuss & Richard, supra note 97, at 445. 
131. RESTATEMENT, supra note 26, at § 33, comment d ("The requirement that the conduct 
be generally recognized as a crime under the law of states that have reasonably developed legal 
systems prevents a state from basing an extension of its jurisdiction on the rule stated in Sub-
section (l)."); F. MANN supra note 72, at 80 ("It would be abusive if a State invoked the 
protective principle without due regard to the importance of the offense. In all cases, here as 
elsewhere, the standard is supplied solely by international law, i.e., by the general practice of 
civilized states.") (footnote omitted). 
132. United States v. James-Robinson, SIS F. Supp. 1340, 1345 (S.D. Fla. 1981). 
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was a demonstrable effect on the United States in particular. " 133 
In light of these requirements, the protective principle can only 
justify prescribing regulations under the EAA in unusual situations. 
The exportation controlled by the Act will rarely be generally con-
sidered criminal activity by the international community, and such 
exports most likely will not impair U.S. interests in particular unless 
the relationship between the United States and the importing nation 
is particularly antagonistic. 
The export controls imposed in the Soviet pipeline case provide a 
clear illustration of the inapplicability of the protective principle. As 
these controls were promulgated under the EAA's provision for for-
eign policy controls,134 the United States would be hard pressed to 
justify its assertion of jurisdiction by national security concerns.135 
Moreover, since the controlled exportations were neither generally 
considered criminal by the international community, nor likely to 
produce effects on the United States in particular, the protective 
principle cannot justify extraterritorial controls in this situation. 
C. Resolving Conflicts of Jurisdiction 
While the jurisdictional basis for extraterritorial application of 
the EAA by the United States is quite dubious in most cases, it is 
particularly weak when the Act's controls create a direct conflict with 
another sovereign's assertion of jurisdiction.136 Such was the situa-
tion in the Soviet pipeline case, as a number of European nations 
took action that was intended to force corporations within their terri-
tory to disregard the dictates of the EAA. 137 In these circumstances, 
even if the United States can establish some jurisdictional basis, 
principles of international law may persuade the United States to 
refrain from asserting jurisdiction. 
Traditional rules of international law resolved such conflicts of 
133. SIS F. Supp. 1340, 1345 (emphasis in original). 
134. See note 7 supra. 
135. See Compagnie Europeenne des Petroles S.A. v. Sensor Nederland B.V., No. 82/716 
(Dist. Ct. The Hague Sept. 17, 1982), cited in John Brown memorandum, supra note 56, at 
Exhibit 6 (holding that foreign policy controls do not justify assertion of jurisdiction under the 
protective principle). 
136. This section focuses on the use of a balancing test when two or more nations assert 
jurisdiction, thereby creating a jursidictional conflict. It is important to note, however, that the 
use of the balancing approach may not be limited to such clear situations of conflict. Indeed, 
there is growing support in the United States for always balancing United States interests in 
extraterritorial application of United States law against the interests of nations whose territo-
rial integrity may be effected before sustaining the United States' assertion of jurisdiction. See, 
e.g., RESTATEMENT (Revised), supra note 80, § 403; Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of 
America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). While an actual assertion of jurisdiction by the affected 
nations helps evidence the strength of their interests, and in light of the Soviet pipeline this 
case seems highly likely in future cases, it need not be a precondition to application of the 
balancing test. 
137. See note 15 supra. 
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jurisdiction by focusing on the preeminence of the territorial princi-
ple.138 However, in recent years a balancing approach to conflicts of 
jurisdiction has developed a broad base of support in the United 
States in case law, 139 in legal commentary, 140 and in the position 
taken by the Justice Depa'rtment. 141 
Section 40 of the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law 
recognized and codified the need to balance the competing interests 
of nations asserting jurisdiction.142 The Restatement provides that 
where two ·states enjoy concurrent jurisdiction, and the rules they 
prescribe may require inc~nsistent conduct by a person, interna-
tional law requires each state to consider moderating its enforcement 
jurisdiction in light of factors such as: 
(a) vital national interests of each of the states, 
(b) the extent and nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforce-
ment actions would impose upon the person, 
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the 
territory of the other state, 
( d) the nationality of the person, and 
(e) the extent to which the enforcement action of either state can rea-
sonably be expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by 
the state.143 · 
An analysis of many of these factors - for example, the relative 
national interests of the involved states - will vary substantially in 
different scenarios involving extraterritorial application of the EAA. 
Other factors, such as territoriality, will remain fairly constant. An 
138. See, e.g., IL. OPPENHEIM,supra note 64, at § 128 ("The duty to respect the territorial 
supremacy of a foreign State must prevent a State from performing acts which, although they 
are according to its personal supremacy within its competence, would violate the territorial 
supremacy of the foreign state."). 
139. See, e.g., Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide and Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 
702-08 (1962); In re the Uranium Antitrust Litigation, Westinghouse Elec. Indus. Corp. v. Reo 
Algom, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 
1287 (3d Cir. 1979); Timberlane Lumber Co., v. Bank of American, 549 F.2d 597, 605-6 (9th 
Cir. 1976); United States v. First Natl. Bank, 396 F.2d 897 (2d. Cir. 1968). 
140. See, e.g., Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction al a Crossroads: An Intersection Between 
Public and Private International Law, 76 AM. J. INTL. L. 280 (1982); RESTATEMENT, supra note 
26, at § 40; Somarajah, The Extralerrilorial Enforcement of U.S. Antitrust Laws: Co'!flict and 
Compromise, 11 INTL. COMP. L.Q. 127 (1982); Jacobs, Extraterritorial Application of Competi-
tion Laws: An English View, 13 INTL. LAW 645 (1979); Note, Extraterritorial Application of 
United Slates Laws: A Co'!flicl of Laws Approach, 28 STAN, L. REV. 1005 (1976). 
141. See W. FUGATE, supra note 117, at 443. 
142. RESTATEMENT, supra note 26, at§ 40. The test found in Section 40 of the RESTATE· 
MENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELA'tIONS LAW is widely used by the courts. See, e.g,, United 
States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384, 1389 (I Ith Cir. 1982) (!n re Grand Jury Proceed-
ings); United States v. Vetco, Inc., 644 F.2d 1324, 1331 (9th Cir. 1981). Several commentators 
and courts have suggested alternative tests that are similar to§ 40 of the RESTATEMENT, See, 
e.g,. Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297 (3d Cir. 1979); 
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 607 (9th Cir. 1976); K. BREWSTER, 
ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 446 (1958); RESTATEMENT (Revised), supra 
note 80, § 403. 
143. RESTATEMENT, supra note 26, at § 40. 
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analysis of all of these concerns, in the context of the Soviet Pipeline 
case, indicates that the balancing approach should often compel the 
United States to moderate its asserted jurisdiction under the EAA. 
The comments to the Restatement define the term "vital national 
interest" as "an interest such as national security or general welfare 
to which the state attaches overriding importance." 144 While the 
stated purpose of the EAA controls was to "advance reconciliation in 
Poland," 145 other underlying objectives were preventing the Soviet 
Union from gaining hard currency from the sale of gas to Europe 
and avoiding European dependence on Soviet energy supplies. 
However, these concerns were also relevant to the European decision 
- their national security was most directly threatened by their in-
creased dependence on Russia. Their decision to participate in the 
pipeline venture implicitly reflects their belief that such concerns 
were outweighed by their interest in the thousands of jobs and bil-
lions of dollars in trade generated by the pipeline, as well as the pos-
sibility of diversifying their energy sources.146 While the relative 
weight of the competing considerations is subject to debate, the fact 
that the parties most directly affected by these competing concerns 
- the European nations - decided in favor of the pipeline, suggests 
that this factor counsels against American jurisdiction. 
The Restatement's second factor - the extent and nature of the 
hardship of inconsistent enforcement - provides no basis for favor-
ing any party's exercise of jurisdiction in the Soviet pipeline case. 
While courts in other contexts have examined whether each party is 
imposing civil or criminal sanctions, 147 this inquiry has little utility 
in the Soviet pipeline case because many of the parties were invok-
ing criminal sanctions. With strong penalties on both sides of the 
Atlantic awaiting the targeted corporations, enforcement by any of 
the parties could create great hardships on the corporations. Yet, 
while this concern does not identify the state that should yield on its 
claim to jurisdiction, the impossible situation of the corporations fac-
ing severe penalties for both obeying and defying the controls makes 
a very strong case for moderation on the part of the national 
governments. 
The third and fourth factors mentioned in the Restatement - the 
location of the regulated activity and the nationality of the regulated 
party - have been discussed in detail earlier, and both argue 
strongly in favor of the Europeans' exercise of enforcement jurisdic-
144. Id. at § 40, co=ent b. 
145. Statement on Extension of U.S. Sanctions, 18 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 820 (June 
21, 1982). 
146.· See Over to the Lawyers, ECONOMIST, Aug. 14, 1982, at 59. 
147. See, e.g., United States v. First Natl. City Bank, 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968); Ohio v. 
Arthur Andersen & Co., 570 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir. 1978). 
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tion. As the very essence of extraterritorial export controls is control 
over the exports of corporations located outside the United States -
in this case, in Europe - the location test supports European juris-
diction. The same result is dictated by considerations of nationality. 
It is clear that European licensees are European nationals even if 
their goods originate in the United States. 148 Although this is not 
quite as clear, the majority tests do indicate that the foreign subsidi-
aries regulated by the EAA should also be considered European 
nationals. 149 
Finally, the Restatement looks to the extent to which the enforce-
ment action by either state will achieve compliance with the rule pre-
scribed by the state. In the Soviet pipeline case, the U.S. order was 
defied by France, Great Britian, and Italy, among others. 150 All of 
these states ordered their corporations to fulfill the export contracts 
with the Soviet Union and all of the companies complied. The 
United States had to fall back to applying sanctions on the corpora-
tions, based in its territory even though these corporations were pow-
erless to prevent most of the exports. 
In short, even if the United States has some basis for extraterrito-
rial enforcement of the EAA, the Restatement's balancing test consi-
tutes an additional barrier to enforcement. The foregoing analysis of 
the Soviet Pipeline case illustrates how many of the factors enumer-
ated in section 40 will typically require the United States to moder-
ate its enforcement of the EAA and acquiesce to the stronger 
jurisdictional claims of the countries where the subsidiaries, goods or 
technology are located. Given the relationship between interna-
tional and municipal law in the United States,151 and the clarity with 
which the EAA expresses a congressional intention to enable extra-
territorial jurisdiction, such restraint must take the form either of 
executive branch moderation in the enforcement of the Act (which 
seems improbable once the President has determined to invoke the 
Act to begin with), or legislative amendment of the EAA to incorpo-
rate the Restatement's approach to resolving conflicting claims to 
jurisdiction. 152 
148. See notes 98-99 supra and accompanying text. 
149. See notes 86-94 supra and accompanying text. 
150. See, e.g., J. OF COMM., Aug. 3, 1982, at I, col. 6. 
151. See notes 44-47 supra and accompanying text. 
152. This approach would enable an American corporation to defend itself in the federal 
courts by arguing that the Act itself incorporates international law by reference, so that domes-
tic legislation subject to judicial rather than executive interpretation would require weighing 
the various interests. The courts have conducted just such a balancing approach when a civil 
discovery order conflicted with the asserted jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign. See United 
States v. First Natl. City Bank, 396 F.2d 897 (1968) (per Kaufman, C.J.). Amending the EAA 
to incorporate the REsTATEMENT's approach to conflicts of international jurisdiction would 
enable a similar solution in the export control area. 
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Even though Congress delegated to the President the power to 
control exports extraterritorially, this power has, at best, tenuous 
support under international law. The affected countries can support 
their claims of jurisdiction with the territorial and nationality princi-
ples while the United States must claim jurisdiction on minority po-
sitions such as the ownership and control theory of corporate 
nationality. Furthermore, any attempt to enforce the EAA extrater-
ritorially runs the risk of violating the sovereignty of other nations as 
well as the duty of nonintervention. 
The politial and economic costs of extraterritorial export controls 
are significant.153 These controls engender vehement protests, 154 
strain relations with allies, create the loss of hundreds- of millions of 
dollars in exports155 and damage the reputation of American export-
ers as reliable sources of goods.156 These political and economic 
costs are incurred despite the fact that the effectiveness of export em-
bargoes has been severely questioned.157 
There are several ways to prevent or attenuate the political and 
economic costs of extraterritorial export controls. For example, 
Congress could limit export controls to those rare situations in which 
they can be validated under international law, tighten the criteria for 
implementation of controls, 158 or eliminate extraterritorial export 
controls altogether. Congress could also reserve the right to veto any 
presidential action that does not meet the statutory guidelines. 159 
The executive branch could also mitigate the problems caused by 
extraterritorial export controls by seeking better coordination on ex-
port control policy160 and refraining from unilateral action when the 
cooperation of our allies cannot be obtained. 
Assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction are increasing on both 
153. See generally Abbott, supra note 13, at 826-57; Berman & Garson, supra note 22, at 
876-78. 
154. See, e.g., note 14 supra. 
155. See Abbott, supra note 13, at 826-31; Berman & Garson, supra note 22, at 876-77. 
156. See Abbott, supra note 13, at 831-37. 
157. See Abbott, supra note 13, at 800-21. See also id. at 84 (concluding that there is a 
"striking consensus" that economic sanctions have been ineffective in the fulfillment of their 
objectives). Accord H. STRACK, SANCTIONS: THE CASE OF RHODESIA 253 (1978); Taubenfeld 
& Taubenfeld, The "Economic Weapon'~· The League and the United Nations, 1964 AM. Socv. 
INTL. L. PROC. 183, 188 (1964). 
158. Among other things, Congress could require the President not to apply export con-
trols if "equivalent products" are available from other sources or require that enforcement 
measures not be taken in countries that have been consulted and refuse to adhere to the Amer-
ican position due to foreign policy differences. 
159. Congress has often retained veto power in trade-related matters. See, e.g., Trade Act 
of 1974, §§ 151, 152, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2191, 2192 (1976). 
160. For a detailed discussion of current and past multilateral attempts for a coordinated 
export control policy, see Berman & Garson, supra note 22, at 834-42. 
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sides of the Atlantic. 161 The political furor created by the BAA ex-
port controls in the Soviet Pipeline case could provide the needed 
impetus for constructive negotiations to prevent, or at least to regu-
late, this form of economic warfare in the future. 
161. See Vagts, A Turnabout in Extraterritoriality, 16 AM. J. INTL. L. 591 (noting recent 
extraterritorial laws, passed by European nations and subsequent Amerlcan protests). 
